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WedevelopaBayesianestimationprocedureforspatialmodelsofrollcallvoting. Weshow
how a Bayesian approach to roll call analysis overcomes shortcomings and idiosyncracies
of NOMINATE (some of which are not widely recognized). Our Bayesian approach (a) applies
to any legislative setting, irrespective of size, legislative extremism, or the number of roll
calls available for analysis; (b) provides a mechanism for directly incorporating auxiliary
information as to the dimensionality of the underlying policy space, the identity of extremist
legislators, key votes and the evolution of the legislative agenda; (c) lets us integrate
measurement of legislative preferences with the analysis of those preferences.
Notes to NEMP, May 2002
This paper sets out our ‘‘basic setup’’ (a Bayesian statistical operationalization of the
Euclidean spatial voting model with roll call data), and constrasts it with the NOMINATE
algorithms of Poole and Rosenthal. In the talk I will be considering extensions to our
model, so as to accommodate and/or test conjectures in the literature on legislative politics
(most prominently, the ‘‘party discipline’’ hypothesis, and conjectures about legislative
responsiveness to constituency interests).1. Introduction: The Uses of Roll Call Data
Roll call data -- the recorded votes of deliberative bodies such as legislatures and courts1
--- are used extensively by political scientists in three ways. First, roll call data are used to
estimate the ‘‘revealed preferences’’ or ‘‘ideal points’’ of legislators, allowing descriptions
of deliberative bodies. For instance, graphically inspecting ideal point estimates reveals
the extent to which legislators coalesce by partisan affiliation or region, or change their
spatial locations over time. Ideologically moderate (and hence often pivotal) legislators can
be also identified and distinguished from ideologically extreme legislators. Second, we can
identifypoliticallyinterestingrollcalls, say, thosevotesthataretypicalofthewaylegislators
separate on the recovered spatial dimensions. Alternatively, we can identify roll calls that
cut across ideological dimensions, perhaps threatening party or coalitional stability. Third,
armed with ideal point estimates, researchers can test theories of legislative behavior, with
ideal point estimates appearing as in regression models. Roll call data serves similar uses in
non-academic settings. Interest groups and non-academic researchers inspect roll call data
to produce ‘‘ratings’’ and lists of key votes (examples include National Journal, Americans
for Democratic Action, American Civil Liberties Union, National Taxpayers Union, American
Conservative Union).
Within political science, it is safe to say that one method for estimating legislators’ ideal
points dominates: the NOMINATE algorithms of Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal. It is
difficult to understate the impact of NOMINATE scores on the empirical study of legislative
behavior. NOMINATE scores make conjectures about legislative behavior amenable to
quantitative analysis, helping make the study of legislative politics an empirically-grounded,
cumulative body of scientific knowledge. Poole and Rosenthal are also responsible for one
of the largest and most important data collections in political science: every roll call cast
in the U.S. Congress. Indeed, for many students of American legislative politics (or, more
generally, American political history), data collection begins with a visit to Keith Poole’s
website (http://voteview.uh.edu) to download the relevant set of NOMINATE scores.
For the most part, the availability of ‘‘quasi-canonical’’ or ‘‘off-the-shelf’’ ideal point
estimates is a boon for students of legislative politics. Researchers need not bother
themselves with the intricacies of psychometric scaling procedures, and are able to get on
with the scientific study of legislative politics. A small sampling of recent scholarship relying
on ideal point estimates is listed in Table 1, with NOMINATE dominating the list of ideal point
estimators. Inshort,byanyreasonablestandard,NOMINATEisoneofpoliticalmethodology’s
most useful contributions to political science.
Butthereisadownsidetothisdivisionoflabor. Formanypoliticalscientists,NOMINATEis
1Court decisions are not ‘‘roll calls’’, but can be analyzed in the same way as legislative roll call data.Author Measure Purpose
Aldrich (1995, 88-91) NOMINATE asessing dimensionality of legislative politics
Binder (1999) NOMINATE identify moderate legislators, measure ideo-
logical heterogeneity, ideological differences
between House and Senate
Cox and McCubbins
(1993)
NOMINATE locate and compare party and committee me-
dians
Dion and Huber (1996);
Krehbiel (1997)
ADA scores identify preference outliers and measure ideo-
logical heterogeneity, in multivariate analysis
of use of restrictive rules
Epstein and O’Halloran
(1999, ch7)
NOMINATE locate and compare preferences of floor and
committee medians
Hix (2001); Noury (2001) NOMINATE partycohesionandideologicalstructureinthe
European Parliament
Jenkins (1999) W-NOMINATE assess dimensionality of ideological space;
ideal point estimates as control in regression
tapping influence of party on close votes
Jenkins (2000) W-NOMINATE assess stability in ideal point locations over
time
Kalt and Zupan (1984) interest-group scores estimate effects of lobbying and ideology on
specific roll calls
Krehbiel (1998) NOMINATE divide legislators into quartiles
Krehbiel and Rivers
(1988); Bartels (1991)
ordered probit use small sequence of votes and legislator-
specific covariates to simultaneously estimate
idealpointsandbilllocations;testconjectures
about sources of preference heterogeneity
Lewis (2001) random effects estimate preferences on abortion, U.S. House,
1973-2000; recovers mean and variance of
party-specific distributions of ideal points
Londregan (2000b) problem-specific maxi-
mum likelihood estima-
tor
tests theory of proposal-setting power in
Chilean Senate committees
McCarty, Poole and
Rosenthal (2001)
non-parametric optimal
classification (Poole
2000)
assess party disicpline
Schickler (2000) DW-NOMINATE location of floor and party medians, measure
of party homogeneity
Snyder and Groseclose
(2000)
factoranalysis(Heckman
and Snyder 1997)
ideal point estimates from lop-sided votes
used as controls in regressions tapping party
influence
Voeten (2000) NOMINATE descriptionofcoalitionsandideologicalcleav-
ages in the United Nations General Assembly
Table 1. Selection of Ideal Point Estimators and their Uses.
2essentiallya‘‘blackbox’’takingrollcalldataasinput,andproducingidealpointestimatesas
output. ThestatisticalpropertiesofNOMINATE’sproceduresanditsestimatesareunderstood
by just a handful of political scientists. And among the discipline’s leading methodologists,
there has been considerable debate as to the statistical properties of NOMINATE scores.
More importantly, statistical theory and practice for ideal point estimation has developed
considerably since NOMINATE was first developed.
2. Improving on NOMINATE
We present a method for analyzing roll call data that exploits several of these recent
statistical advances. Our approach overcomes some shortcomings and idiosyncratic features
of NOMINATE, which are neither widely recognized nor understood, although most are
acknowledged by Poole and Rosenthal themselves.
1. Application to All Legislative Settings: NOMINATE is a ‘‘large n’’ algorithm, and does
not work well with small numbers of legislators, small numbers of roll calls, or small
numbers of both. In personal communication with Keith Poole, we were advised not to
run W-NOMINATE (one of several versions of the NOMINATE algorithms) with fewer than
50 legislators, and Poole kindly sent us an alternate version of the software to use in
such a setting (we were analyzing Supreme Court data, see section 5, below). As we
show below, our Bayesian approach can be applied to all legislative settings, no matter
how big or small the legislature, and irrespective of the number of roll calls. No special
modifications of our model or method are required to deal with specific roll call data
sets.2
2. Use as Much Data as Possible: Lop-sided roll calls or legislators with extremist voting
recordsposeproblemsforNOMINATE.PooleandRosenthal(1997,245)usuallydiscard
rollcallsdecidedwithfewerthan2.5percentofthelegislatorsintheminority. Dropping
these lop-sided roll calls usually results in a loss of discrimination among extremist
legislators, and hence an over-estimate of ideological agreement among extremists. In
addition, legislators voting fewer than 25 times in a given Congress are dropped from
all the analyses reported in Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) book.
2In particular, our Bayesian approach helps us avoid what Londregan terms the ‘‘granularity’’ problem
inherent in roll call analysis; that is, since the discrete character of the observed data (binary ‘‘ayes’’ and
‘‘nays’’)‘‘...imposesanartificialgranularityontheparameterspaceofpossiblepreferredoutcomesforlegislators
and possible locations for bills’’ (Londregan 2000a, 35). In turn, Londregan shows that the ‘‘granularity’’ of
roll call data makes identification of model parameters dubious. In our Bayesian approach, we are obliged
to specify prior densities over all parameters, which solve these problems. We use smooth (normal) priors,
ensuring that the resulting posterior density is also smooth, no matter how sparse and ‘‘granular’’ the roll call
data, or irregular the likelihood.
3Excluding particular legislators or roll calls ought not to be the ‘‘default’’ procedure,
driven by the need to avoid computational problems. In the Bayesian approach, proper
prior distributions over ideal points and roll call parameters ensure that extremist
legislators and/or lop-sided roll calls do not generate numerical instabilities. We avoid
having to assume we can’t learn about the ideal points of legislators with short voting
histories, or that certain roll calls are completely uninformative with respect to ideal
points.3 Recall that in the Bayesian approach, the posterior density is proportional
to the prior density times the likelihood; if the data are uninformative about some
parameter h, the likelihood over h will be flat, and the posterior and prior for h will
coincide (i.e., nothing has been learned about h by looking at the data). In short, the
Bayesian approach lets us avoid ad hoc assumptions about which data to retain for
analysis, and the resulting estimates and inferences exploit as much data as possible.
3. Inferences for All Model Parameters: NOMINATE generally produces standard errors
for ideal points that are too small (we demonstrate this below). Almost all likelihood-
based approaches4 apply some kind of conditioning strategy: i.e., standard errors for
ideal point estimates are computed by assuming that parameters specific to votes are
known with absolute certainty. In other words, uncertainty as to the location of cutting
points (the midpoint of the ‘‘Aye’’ and ‘‘Nay’’ locations) is ignored when computing
standard errors for the ideal points; see Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 246). This
assumption drastically reduces the size of a matrix inversion problem; we elaborate in
section 4.1. Hence, Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 246) note that ‘‘...the standard errors
producedbytheD-NOMINATEalgorithm[anotherversionofNOMINATE]mustbeviewed
as heuristic descriptive statistics.’’
ContrastourfullyBayesianapproach. Werecoverthejointposteriordensityofallmodel
parameters, with the uncertainty in any one subset of parameters fully propagating
into all other subsets of parameters. Our uncertainty assessments (posterior standard
deviations, confidence intervals, etc) reflect uncertainty from all sources, and are not
merely ‘‘heuristic descriptive statistics.’’
4. NOMINATE’s estimates are not maximum likelihood estimates: The objective
function underlying the NOMINATE estimation procedures is a likelihood function.
But in the course of optimizing that objective function, NOMINATE uses a set of ad
3In principle, we could even include unanimous roll calls, but since there is no discriminatory information in
these roll calls we drop them from our analyses.
4A rare exception arises in the analysis of small roll call data sets and/or analysis employing specialized
versions of a spatial voting model. In these rare instances direct MLE may be feasible. For instance, see
Londregan’s (2000b) innovative analyses of voting in committees of the Chilean Senate.
4hoc constraints to both identify the model parameters and solve some computational
problems. At every iteration in the fitting process, NOMINATE re-scales its ideal point
estimates to lie in the unit hypersphere.5 As Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 279) concede:
The use of constraints is another source of caution. It implies that some
estimated parameters do not represent --- even with the condition that other
parameters remain constant --- maximum-likelihood estimates.
In our Bayesian approach we solve identification problems by specifying proper prior
densities over model parameters. Since priors are an integral part of the Bayesian
approach, they pose no special problems in terms of computation, estimation, or
inference. In short, we require no ad hoc fixes to deal with computational problems or
numerical instabilities.6
5. IntegratingMeasurementwithAnalysis:Mostidealpointestimatorsarenotequipped
to incorporate covariates specific to roll-calls or legislators, and as such, are tools for
measuring ideal points, but not for analyzing legislative politics. For instance, most
empiricalstudiesemployingidealpointestimatesare‘‘two-stage’’studies:researchers
useNOMINATEtogenerateidealpointestimates,andthenusethoseestimatesas‘‘data’’
in regressions (e.g., regressing NOMINATE scores on measures of district ideology,
personalcharacteristicsoflegislators,orpreviousNOMINATEscores;forexamples,see
Table 1). These ‘‘two-stage’’ analyses are common in empirical studies of legislative
politics. One potentially troubling feature of these studies is the unproblematic use of
ideal point estimates in second stage regression analysis. Since NOMINATE scores or
any ideal point estimate is an estimate, it is not perfect, but subject to measurement
error; the magnitudeofthemeasurementerrorisreflectedinthestandarderrorofeach
ideal point estimate, or, in our Bayesian approach, in the standard deviation of the
5In describing the W-NOMINATE algorithm, Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 250) note that
...if the furthest left/right legislator’s coordinate ‘‘blows up,’’ as a result of perfect or near-perfect
liberal or conservative voting, and is 0.1 units or more away from the nearest legislator, then the
legislator’s coordinate is constrained in that it is not estimated during the next iteration....this sets
the coordinate at either -1 or +1.
6In addition, the NOMINATE algorithms report convergence not when the log-likelihood is (apparently)
maximized, but when (at least for D-NOMINATE)
...parameters all correlate at 0.99 or better with the set estimated on the previous...iteration.
Typically, by this criterion, D-NOMINATE converges within three global iterations. (Poole and
Rosenthal 1997, 237)
This is a rather unusual convergence criterion, and for likelihoods that are unusually flat (say, when model
parameters are barely identified, which is not unusual in roll call analysis), is a potentially misleading
convergence criterion.
5posterior density. The use of ideal point estimates in regression analysis gives rise to a
‘‘errors-in-variables’’problem, almostuniversallyignoredbystudentsofcongressional
politics.7 Consequently, some rare exceptions aside, published studies using ideal
point estimates in second-stage analyses may warrant re-evaluation!
In the analysis below, we assess the magnitude of this ‘‘errors-in-variables’’ problem
for empirical studies of legislatures. In particular, our Bayesian model easily extends
to accommodate covariates, in effect, collapsing the current practice of ‘‘two-stage’’
analyses into a one model.8 A Bayesian hierarchical model ensures that uncertainty
generated in estimating ideal points propagates into uncertainty into inferences about
structural parameters (e.g., the stability of ideal points over time, the effects of district
and legislator-specific covariates on legislator ideology). And quite aside from testing
theories, covariates supply an extra source of information with which to produce more
precise estimates of ideal points; for example, see Bailey’s (2001) use of covariates in
an analyzing five roll calls on trade in the U.S. Senate.)
6. Bringing Auxiliary Information to Bear: Researchers often have auxiliary information
about the relative locations of legislators and about the nature of particular roll calls.
For instance, each year National Journal publishes a list of key roll calls in three broadly
defined policy areas: economic, social and foreign policy. Supreme Court cases are
also classified by their substantive content (e.g., Spaeth 2001). Historians can identify
roll calls leading up to the Civil War that are widely thought to be driven more by
preferences over slavery than by preferences over a traditional ‘‘left-right’’ dimension
(e.g., Weingast 1998). And in generating ratings of legislators, interest groups identify
roll calls that are considered to reflect preferences over particular policy dimensions,
some quite narrowly defined (e.g., civil liberties, worker’s rights, taxation, abortion
rights,environmentalism,federalism,benefitsforseniors,farmaid,etc). Inshort,there
is often considerable amount of information as to the dimensions that might plausibly
underlie roll call data.
To the best our knowledge, there is no way to let the NOMINATE algorithms exploit this
auxiliary information linking particular roll calls with particular dimensions. NOMINATE
is agnostic with respect to the substantive meaning of the recovered dimensions, in
much the same way as exploratory factor analysis decomposes data into a number of
7Rare examples of an acknowledgment of this ‘‘errors-in-variables’’ problem include Londregan and Snyder
(1994) and Snyder and Groseclose (2000).
8Ausefulanalogyhereisthedifferencebetween,say,usingexploratoryfactoranalysistogeneratemeasures
(factor scores) that are then used as regressors in a subsequent analysis, versus the structural equation
modeling paradigm (e.g., Bollen 1989), embodied in software packages such as LISREL, in which measurement
models and structural models of substantive interest are estimated jointly.
6user-specific dimensions. The substantive nature of the policy dimensions recovered
by NOMINATE is deduced ex post, by inspecting the distribution of ideal points through
the policy space, or by inspecting the slopes of estimated cutting planes (e.g., Poole
and Rosenthal 1997, chs5-7).
In contrast, the Bayesian approach provides a natural way to incorporate this ‘‘infor-
mation’’, via the specification of informative priors on particular roll-call parameters.
The extent to which the data support these priors can be easily examined. For instance,
a simple test of the ‘‘uniqueness’’ of a particular dimension is to examine the extent
to which recovered ideal points are correlated across dimensions; if ideal points are
highly correlated across dimensions, then the dimensions are redundant and could be
collapsed with little loss of fit to the data. We provide examples below.
7. Quadratic vs Gaussian utilities: Lastly, our statistical model is a direct operational-
ization of the Euclidean spatial voting model (Enelow and Hinich 1984): legislators
are presumed to have standard quadratic utilities, while NOMINATE assumes Gaus-
sian or normal (‘‘bell curve’’) utility functions. The use of Gaussian utility functions
introduces extraneous scaling parameters in the statistical model for roll calls under-
lying NOMINATE, making estimation and inference unnecessarily complicated; Poole
and Rosenthal (1997, 234-235) discuss how successive versions of NOMINATE have
dealt with these complications.9 But quadratic preferences are far and away the most
commonly used functional form for utility functions in political science and economics,
while Gaussian utilities are extremely rare.
In the next section we show how standard quadratic utilities and normal errors10 lead
to a relatively simple statistical model for roll call analysis.
3. A Statistical Model for Roll Call Analysis
Roll call data can be arranged as Y = {yij}, a n by m matrix indicating whether legislator
i = 1,...,n votes ‘‘Yea’’ (yij = 1), ‘‘Nay’’ (yij = 0) or abstains on proposal j = 1,...,m.
Abstentionsandothermissingrollcallsaremissingdata.Ourstatisticalmodeloperationalizes
theEuclideanspatialvotingmodelasfollows. Eachlegislatori = 1,...,nhasapreferredpolicy
position,xi,apointinad-dimensionalEuclideanpolicyspace. Eachvotej = 1,...,mamounts
9Perhaps the only advantage of Gaussian utilities over quadratic utilities is that the added non-linearity is
sufficient to identify the ‘‘Yea’’ and ‘‘Nay’’ locations, but even Poole (2001, 216) urges that estimates of these
locations ‘‘be used with some caution.’’
10Contrast the use of logit errors in NOMINATE, and uniform errors in Heckman and Snyder (1997). In recent
work Poole (2001, 218) notes that ‘‘...the normal distribution is the most sensible model of error from both a
mathematical standpoint and a behavioral standpoint.’’
7to a choice between ‘‘Yea’’ and ‘‘Nay’’ (or status quo) locations, fj and wj, respectively, also
points in Rd. Legislators vote for the location giving them greatest utility, with standard
‘‘quadratic-loss’’ utilities, Ui(fj) = -||xi -fj||2 +gij and Ui(wj) = -||xi -wj||2 +mij, where gij and mij
are zero-mean normal disturbances, independent across legislators and roll calls.11 and ||·||
is the Euclidean norm. Let y*
ij = Ui(fj) - Ui(wj). Via the assumption of utility maximization,
yij =
(
1 (‘‘Yea’’) ⇐⇒ y*
ij > 0
0 (‘‘Nay’’) ⇐⇒ y*
ij ≤ 0
(1)
After substituting and re-arranging, the utility differential y*
ij can be expressed as linear
function of the unobserved ideal points:
y
*
ij = -||xi - fj||
2 + ||xi - wj||
2 + gij - mij
= 2(fj - wj)
0xi - f
0
jfj + w
0
jwj + eij
= b
0
jxi - αj + eij,
where bj = 2(fj - wj), αj = w0
jwj - f0
jfj and eij = gij - mij. With (1) the censoring rule in (1)
linkingthislatentmodeltotheobservedrollcalls,(2)normalerrorsand(3)thebinaryrollcall
data, we have a probit model, but with the substantial complication that the legislators’ ideal
points (xi) appear as unobserved covariates. In addition, as is standard for binary response
models, we set var(eij) = r2
ij = 1∀ i,j so as to help identify the model. With this normalization,
Pr(yij = 1) = Pr(y*
ij > 0) = U(b0
jxi - αj) where U is the normal CDF. With our assumptions of
conditional independence across legislators and roll calls, the likelihood is
L(B,α,X|Y) =
n Y
i=1
m Y
j=1
U
 
x
0
ibj - αj
yij  
1 - U
 
x
0
ibj - αj
1-yij (2)
where B is a m by d matrix formed by stacking the vectors of proposal-specific slope
parameters b0
1,...,b0
m, α = (α1,...,αm)0, and X is a n by d matrix formed by stacking the ideal
points x0
1,...,x0
n.
The‘‘Yea’’and‘‘Nay’’locationsfj andwj cannotbeuniquelyrecoveredfromtheestimated
bj andαj. Instead,intheunidimensionalcase,werecoverthemidpointbetweentheproposal
11These independence assumptions facilitate estimation, although may be undesirable for at least two
reasons. First, roll calls may be sequentially dependent (e.g., votes on a series of inter-related amendments to a
bill,orproposalsbeingofferedconditionalontheoutcomeofpreviousrollcalls),suchthatthereisaconnection
between the last proposal adopted and the current status quo (e.g., Clinton and Mierowitz 2001). Second, the
model and the stated assumptions do not allow for vote trading, where the legislator derives utility separate
from the location of the proposal relative to his or her ideal point. While perhaps unrealistic, these are common
assumptions in roll call analysis and make a convenient starting point.
8andthestatusquo,(fj+wj)/2asαj/bj. Undertheassumptionof(symmetric)quadraticutilities,
this point separates the ideal points of legislators expected to vote for proposal j from those
legislators expected to vote against proposal j. In higher dimensional settings we recover the
d - 1 dimensional hyperplane separating legislators expected to vote ‘‘Yea’’ from legislators
expected to vote ‘‘Nay.’’
It is well known that in a unidimensional setting (d = 1) this model is equivalent to
the two-parameter item-response model used in educational testing,12 where bj is the item-
discrimination parameter, αj is the item-difficulty parameter, but in the roll call context the
latent trait or ‘‘ability’’ parameter xi is the ideal point of the i-th legislator. Recent advances
in the Bayesian analysis of the two-parameter item-response model (e.g., Johnson and Albert
1999, ch6) are thus directly relevant to roll call analysis, which we detail below.
3.1. Identification via Priors
The estimable parameters X, B and α are only identified only up to an arbitrary scale
factor; i.e., any re-scaling of the latent traits X* = cX is indistinguishable from an offsetting
re-scaling of the slope parameters B* = c-1B. In the Bayesian setting we solve this problem
via the prior p(X) =
Qn
i=1 uD(xi), where ud(·) is the d-dimensional standard normal density,
denoted N(0,Id).13 Unless otherwise noted we use independent N(0,102) priors for the
B and α parameters, letting the data dominate posterior inferences for these bill-specific
parameters.
Rotational invariance is also a problem when fitting the spatial model to roll call data.
In the unidimensional case, all model parameters could be multiplied by c = -1, yielding
an identical fit to the data, or two ‘‘mirror image’’ representations of the data. Neither the
spatial voting model nor the roll call data gives the underlying dimensions polarity, such that
liberals are to the ‘‘left’’ and conservatives to the ‘‘right’’; recall that roll calls are recorded
as ‘‘Yeas’’ and ‘‘Nays,’’ not ‘‘liberal’’ and ‘‘conservative.’’ Again, priors can be used to solve
this identification problem. One might specify relatively precise priors for the ideal points
of legislators known to be ideologically distinctive (e.g., priors that constrain Jesse Helms to
be to the the opposite side of zero from Edward Kennedy), or defining ‘‘reference votes’’ via
informative priors on corresponding bj, where a ‘‘Yea’’ vote is known to correspond with a
particular ideological or policy stance (we provide an example in section 8).
12For example, see Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 247), Bailey and Rivers (1997) and especially Londregan
(2000a).
13The prior variance is largely arbitrary, since in addition to identifying the ideal points, the prior is effectively
providinga‘‘referencescale’’fortheidealpoints; i.e., otherchoiceofpriorvariancewillleadtoacorresponding
re-scaling of the posterior density. The key technical requirement for the prior is that it be concave over
numericallystableregionsoftheparameterspace; propernormalpriorswithreasonablysmallvariancesclearly
satisfy this requirement, as well as simplifying the computations for implementing the Gibbs sampler.
94. Estimation and Inference
Maximum likelihood estimation requires optimizing the likelihood in (2). This is not trivial
given that the number of parameters p is often surprisingly large in even small roll call data
sets. Each of the n ideal points is a vector of length d, while each roll call contributes
d + 1 parameters, for a total of p = n · d + m(d + 1) parameters. Table 2 presents values
of p for particular data sets. A moderately sized roll call data set with n=100, m=500 and
d = 1 (say, for a contemporary U.S. Senate) yields a likelihood function with p = 1,100
unknown parameters, while a two dimensional model has p = 1,700 parameters. A typical
House of Representatives data set has n = 440 and m = 1,000, and so a one dimensional
model has p = 2,440 parameters, while a two dimensional model has p = 3,880 parameters.
Pooling across years dramatically increases the number of parameters: for instance, Poole
and Rosenthal (1997) report that fitting a two dimensional model to roughly two hundred
yearsofU.S.HouseofRepresentativesrollcalldatagaverisetoanoptimizationproblemwith
p > 150,000 parameters.
Legislators Roll Calls Dimensions (d)
Legislature n m 1 2 3
U.S. Supreme Court, 1994-97 9 71 151 231 311
105th U.S. Senate 100 534 1,168 1,802 2,436
93rd U.S. House 442 917 2,276 3,635 4,994
U.S. Senate, 1789-1985 1,714 37,281 76,276 115,271 154,266
U.S. House, 1789-1985 9,759 32,953 75,485 118,017 160,549
Table 2. Parameter Proliferation in the Analysis of Roll Call Data
4.1. Likelihood-based approaches
Optimizing these extremely high-dimensional likelihood functions is a formidable task,
even with recent increases in computing power. A widely used approach in the educational
testing context is to break the p-parameter MLE problem into an inter-related series of
smaller conditional MLE problems (e.g., Bock and Aitken 1981). The NOMINATE procedures
exploit these ideas, alternating between updates of estimates of legislator’s ideal points and
vote-specificparameters, iteratinguntilconvergence(PooleandRosenthal1997, 237). While
this approach can generate feasible parameter estimates relatively cheaply, the standard
errors and resulting inferences are only conditional, ignoring the way that uncertainty in one
set of parameters generates uncertainty in another.
RecallthatstandarderrorsofMLEsarethesquarerootoftheleadingdiagonaloftheinverse
of minus the Hessian matrix, the p-by-p matrix of second derivatives of the log-likelihood
with respect to the parameters, evaluated at the MLEs. But when p is large (as is the case in
10rollcallanalysis), computingtheHessianmatrixandinvertingitisextremelycomputationally
burdensome. Thus, NOMINATE does two smaller matrix inversions --- one to obtain pseudo
standard errors for the ideal point estimates, and another to obtain pseudo standard errors
for the roll call parameters --- but with the cost of ignoring the way that uncertainty in ideal
points generates uncertainty in roll call parameters, and vice-versa. Moreover, when fitting
higher dimensional models, NOMINATE proceeds dimension-by-dimension, fitting higher
dimensional parameters conditional on the estimates for lower dimensional parameters,
essentially treating higher dimensions are the residuum of lower dimensions.14 As a result,
NOMINATE’s pseudo standard errors are generally too small, as we show in two examples,
below.15
But in any event, it is striking how studies employing ideal point estimates, be they from
NOMINATE or elsewhere, have almost universally ignored the uncertainty inherent in ideal
point estimates. Bayesian simulation methods and vast advances in computing power mean
that we can now do better.
4.2. Estimation and Inference via Bayesian Simulation
IntheBayesiancontext,estimationandinferencerequirescomputingtheposteriordensity
p(B,α,X|Y). Whereas MLE seeks parameter values that maximize a p-dimensional likelihood
function,weseekacharacterizationofap-dimensionalposteriordensity(e.g.,thelocationof
thejointposteriormode, thewidthofintervalscontaining95%posteriorprobability, etc). We
use Markov chain Monte Carlo methods (MCMC) to generate this characterization, building
an arbitrarily precise characterization of the posterior density by successively sampling from
the lower-dimensional conditional distributions that together constitute the joint posterior
densityofinterest. AgeneraldiscussionofBayesiansimulationisnotrequiredhere; Jackman
(2000) provides an exposition tailored for political scientists and details specific to the
analysis of roll call data sets are provided in the Appendix. One additional advantage of
the Bayesian simulation approach is that our inferences are arbitrarily exact,16 based on a
computer intensive exploration of the joint posterior density of all model parameters, rather
than relying on an asymptotically-valid Normal approximation to its shape, or some other
approximation such as bootstrapping.
14‘‘Our approach bears a family resemblance to eigenvalue/eigenvector decomposition in that we begin by
estimating the one-dimensional configuration that best accounts for the data. Keeping this first dimension
fixed, we then estimate a second dimension that best accounts for the remaining ‘variance,’ and so on, until the
desired number of dimensions is estimated (Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 239).
15Similarconditioningstrategiesappearinotherlikelihood-basedapproachestorollcallanalysis(e.g.,Bailey
2001).
16The ‘‘exactness’’ of the approximations provided by Bayesian simulation is governed by the number of
posterior samples; the more samples the better, and computer speed is sufficient to let us draw, store and
summarize millions of samples.
115. Example 1: U.S. Supreme Court, 1994--97
Ourfirstexampleischosensoastohighlightsomekeydifferencesbetweenourapproach
andNOMINATE. Wefita unidimensionalspatialvoting modeltoa rollcalldata setcomprising
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, gathered from a larger data collection compiled by
Spaeth (2001). These data contain m=208 non-unanimous decisions of the Court, spanning
1994-97, a period with no turnover among the n = 9 justices (a so-called ‘‘natural court’’).
The decisions of the justices are coded as yij=1 if justice i votes with the majority on case j,
and yij=0 if voting against the majority.
Across the 208 cases there are just 71 unique voting patterns among the nine justices.
This implies that the roll call parameters bj and αj for cases with identical voting patterns
are indistinguishable, and that roughly two-thirds of the data are redundant. Accordingly,
we work with the roll call data set comprising the unique m = 71 voting patterns. By the
standards of roll call analysis, this is a small data set and is a clear case where the large n
assumptions underlying NOMINATE do not hold.
Table 3 compares the results we obtain via Bayesian simulation with NOMINATE’s. As
noted earlier, the W-NOMINATE algorithm doesn’t perform well in ‘‘small-n’’ settings; the
standard version of W-NOMINATE places all point estimates at W-NOMINATE’s boundary
constraintsof-1and1,andwithpseudostandarderrorsofzero. Theseestimatesarepatently
implausible, and Keith Poole sent us specialized version of NOMINATE to use for working the
‘‘small-n’’ court data. Estimates produced by this specialized version of W-NOMINATE appear
in the second column of Table 3, along with pseudo standard errors. Our Bayesian estimates
(posterior means and standard deviations) are reported in the third column.
Our Bayesian estimator does not rely on boundary constraints to uniquely scale the ideal
points;thusourapproachlocatesStevensfurthertotheleftthan‘‘small-n’’W-NOMINATE,and
yields less distance separating the five justices on the right (Kennedy, O’Connor, Rehnquist,
Scalia and Thomas). Both approaches find Justice Stevens to be the most liberal member of
theCourt. Attheotherendoftheideologicalcontinuum,ourBayesianapproachfindsJustices
Scalia and Thomas to be indistinguishable. For instance, the probability that Thomas is to
the right of Scalia is .38; for small-n W-NOMINATE the corresponding probability is .87.17
17Note that while W-NOMINATE reports an estimated pseudo standard error for each estimated ideal point,
it does not report the full variance-covariance matrix of the estimates. This means when using NOMINATE for
pairwise comparisons of ideal points, the ideal point estimates as considered independent, which in general
is not true. Our Bayesian simulation-based approach recovers the joint posterior density of all parameters;
to compute the probability that legislator a lies to the right of legislator b we note the proportion of times
we observe that event occurs in an arbitrarily large number of draws from the joint posterior of the model
parameters.
12‘‘small n’’
W-NOMINATE W-NOMINATE Bayesian
Rehnquist 1.00 .585 .320
(.00) (.057) (.147)
Stevens -1.00 -.992 -1.296
(.00) (.273) (.539)
O’Conner 1.00 .359 .068
(.00) (.031) (.134)
Scalia 1.00 .843 .441
(.00) (.064) (.173)
Kennedy 1.00 .282 .118
(.00) (.037) (.133)
Souter -1.00 -.190 -.084
(.00) (.046) (.135)
Thomas 1.00 .996 .402
(.00) (.136) (.171)
Ginsberg -1.00 -.352 -.081
(.00) (.029) (.134)
Breyer -1.00 -.386 -.183
(.00) (.042) (.143)
Table 3. Ideal Point Estimates, U.S. Supreme Court, 1994-97. Quantities in parentheses
are pseudo standard errors for W-NOMINATE estimates, posterior standard deviations for
Bayesian estimates.
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Figure 1. Posterior Distributions on Left-to-Right Ranks
145.1. Rank-Ordering the Justices
To further compare our approach with NOMINATE, we considered the left-to-right rank
orderings of the justices implied by each methods. That is, uncertainty in the ideal points
generates uncertainty in the ranks of each justice; in our Bayesian approach, we can easily
induce a posterior density on each justice’s rank by simply noting the proportion of times
each justice is found to be the r-th justice ordered left-to-right, where r indexes the possible
ranks (one through nine). We employ a similar procedure to induce rank orderings from the
‘‘small-n W-NOMINATE point estimates.18
Figure 1 compares the induced distributions of ranks. Again, both approaches unam-
biguously find Stevens to be the most liberal justice, followed by Bryer. But beyond that,
there is a reasonable amount of disagreement between the two sets of estimates. NOMINATE
appears to be over-confident with respect to ranks, tending to assign more probability to any
specific rank than our Bayesian approach. In particular, NOMINATE attaches extremely high
probability to Justice Kennedy being the median justice (p ≈ .95). Our Bayesian estimates
reveal considerable uncertainty as to the identity of the median justice: our best guess is
Justice O’Connor (p ≈ .67), but we also attach p ≈ .26 to Justice Kennedy being the median
(Justices Souter and Ginsberg account for the remaining probability mass, .03 and .04,
respectively).
The fact that the two approaches yield these kinds of qualitatively different results with
the same (small) roll call data is striking. We stress that our Bayesian approach employs the
same model, assumptions and estimation strategy irrespective of the size of the legislative
body being analyzed.
6. Example 2: 106th U.S. House
Our second comparison uses roll calls from the 106th U.S. House of Representatives. We
fit a one-dimensional model to these data using W-NOMINATE (the ‘‘standard’’ or ‘‘large n’’
version),aswellasviaourBayesianapproach. Afterdiscardinglop-sidedvotes,W-NOMINATE
uses 871 roll calls, and does not fit an ideal point for Livingston (R-LA) who resigned from
Congress in February 1999 after voting on nineteen roll calls in the 106th House. Lop-sided
votes and short voting records pose no problems in the Bayesian approach, and we are able
to estimate ideal points for all legislators and to include all but unanimous roll calls; we
model 1,073 roll calls in all, comprising 444,326 individual voting decisions. With p = .5
as a classification threshold, we correctly classify 89.9% of the individual voting decisions,
and find that 1,007 (93.8%) of the roll calls discriminate with respect to the single latent
18We generated 1,000 samples from the normal distributions implied by each NOMINATE point estimates and
pseudo standard error.
15dimension.19 In short, a one-dimensional model appears to be a very good characterization
of these roll call data.
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Figure2. ComparisonofW-NOMINATEandBayesianidealpointestimates,106thU.S.House.
W-NOMINATE ‘‘dimension one’’ scores are on the horizontal axis; our Bayesian estimates
(posterior means) appear on the vertical axis.
Figure 2 compares our ideal point estimates (vertical axis) with W-NOMINATE (horizontal
19Thatis,these1,007rollcallsallhadslopecoefficients(bj1,theequivalentofitem-discriminationparameters)
whose 90% posterior confidence intervals did not cover zero. Just two of the 66 roll calls that fail to ‘‘load’’ on
the recovered dimension were decided by margins closer than 60%-40%.
16axis) for the 106th U.S. House. If the two methods produced identical results, the two sets of
ideal point estimates would all fall on the dotted 45 degree line. While the estimates do not
lieonthis45degreeline,therelationshipbetweenthetwosetsofestimatesisalmostexactly
linear (the correlation between the two sets of estimates is .996). The difference in scale
and location stem from the different approaches to identification. NOMINATE uniquely scales
the ideal points by constraining the ideal points of the most liberal and most conservative
legislators to -1.0 and 1.0, respectively. In contrast, we uniquely scale the ideal points with a
common N(0,1) prior density. Although the two methods roughly agree on the location of the
most extreme liberals (around -1.0), the estimates differ from almost all other legislators; the
regressionlineinFigure2departsfromthe45-degreelineasNOMINATEessentiallyre-scales
the fit so as to make the most conservative member 1, whereas the Bayesian approach
finds the most conservative legislator at .45. Because our approach is Bayesian, we can
give a substantive interpretation to this assymetry in scale. Differences between priors and
posteriors reflect the information content of the data. Since we assign a zero-mean prior for
alllegislators, theassymetryintheresultsindicatesthatthedataaremoreinformativeabout
extreme liberals (Democrats) than extreme conservatives (Republicans). Put differently, the
(majority)RepublicanpartyvotedmorecohesivelythandidmembersoftheDemocraticparty,
giving us less discriminatory power among Republicans than among Democrats.
The regression fit in Figure 2 lets us map between the two sets of estimates, providing
a way for us to compare our posterior standard deviations with the pseudo standard errors
produced by NOMINATE.20 Figure 3 presents these comparions of standard errors.21 Again,
if the two sets of estimates produced the same standard errors -- even after we correct for
differences in scale -- then the plotted points would lie on the 45 degree line. Instead the
points in Figure 3 are all below the 45 degree line, indicating that W-NOMINATE’s pseudo
standard errors are too small. This is particularly true for the four legislators labelled on
the graph, who our estimates reveal as the four most liberal legislators. On average, the
NOMINATE pseudo standard errors are too small by a factor of 1.73. We suspect that
this underestimate of the standard errors reflect the fact that NOMINATE computes pseudo
standard errors for the ideal points after conditioning on its estimates of all other model
parameters; as mentioned earlier, uncertainty in these parameters is is not let permitted to
propagate into uncertainty assessments for the ideal points, generating pseudo standard
20We do this by mapping our posterior 95% confidence bounds into the NOMINATE metric, projecting through
the regression line of Figure 2, and then dividing the width of the transformed 95% confidence interval by 2 ×
1.96 to obtain the rough equivalent of a pseudo standard error in the NOMINATE metric.
21Pseudo standard errors for the following legislators with relatively few roll calls are omitted from this
comparison: Livingstone (R, LA-1), dropped from the analysis by NOMINATE; Brown (D, CA-42); Matthew
Martinez’s(CA-31)recordasaRepublican(MartinezswitchedpartiesafterlosingtheDemocraticPartyprimary);
and Speaker Hastert (R, IL-14).
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Figure 3. Comparison of NOMINATE and Bayesian Uncertainty Assessments, One-
Dimensional Ideal Point Estimates, 106th U.S. House.
18errors that are too small.
In addition, W-NOMINATE’s pseudo standard errors remain constant irrespective of the
dimensionality of the model being fitted. That is, when we move from a one-dimensional
model to a two dimensional model, W-NOMINATE suffers no loss of precision on the first
dimension. This is unrealistic, since the same data are being asked to fit many more
parameters in the higher dimensional model. Figure 4 compares the pseudo standard errors
for ideal point estimates produced by one and two dimensional fits to roll call data from the
105th U.S. Senate. One-dimensional pseudo standard errors are plotted on the horizontal
axis; pseudo standard errors for the first dimension from the two dimensional fit are plotted
on the vertical axis (for our Bayesian estimator we use posterior standard deviations).
Our Bayesian estimator becomes less precise as we shift to higher dimensions, while W-
NOMINATE produces identical estimates and pseudo standard errors for the first dimension
component of the ideal points. This peculiar feature of W-NOMINATE is a product of its
dimension-by-dimension fitting algorithm: the dimensions presumed to underlie legislative
behavior are treated as a series of best-fitting, orthogonal projections through the data, with
higher dimensions picking up variance unexplained by lower dimensions. This approach
rests on a strong presumption of independence across dimensions: i.e., knowing that roll
call j discriminates significantly on dimension d provides no information as to whether roll
call j discriminates on any other dimension, nor does knowing the location of legislator i
on dimension d convey any information to the legislator’s location on any other dimension.
Another consequence is that NOMINATE presumes that the substantive meaning of lower
dimensionsremainsunchangedasthedimensionalityoftheproposalspaceincreases; while
computationally convenient, this is somewhat unrealistic both as a measurement model and
as a description of legislative politics.
7. Uncertainty and Ideological Stability
Ideal points estimates are just that -- estimates -- and are accompanied by measurement
error. This measurement error is typically ignored by researchers utilizing ideal point
estimates in secondary analyses. A typical application is to assess stability in ideal points
over time, with high cross-period correlations interpreted as evidence of ideological stability
(assuming that the content of the roll calls does not significantly change). Examples include
assessing stability in the U.S. Congress (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal (1985)), the U.S. Supreme
Court (e.g., Baum (1988)), and the Confederate House (e.g., Jenkins (1999)). In addition to
correlating ideal points across time, scholars have also sought to determine the correlation
between ideal points and covariates of interest (e.g., Kollman (1997)).
Ignoring the measurement error inherent in ideal point estimates gives rise to a ‘‘errors-
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20in-variables’’ problem. In particular, when ideal point estimates are used as explanatory
variables, the usual estimators of association (correlations or regression coefficients) are
biasedandinconsistent.Whenidealpointestimatesareusedinananalysisonlyasdependent
variables,theresultingregressioncoefficientsareunbiasedandconsistent,butwithstandard
errors that are too small, risking Type 1 error (falsely rejecting the null hypothesis). Note
that when computing cross-period correlations in ideal points, we encounter both problems:
biased and inconsistent point estimates, with standard errors that are too small.
Weillustratetheimplicationsofmeasurementerrorforworkingwithidealpointestimates
in three settings, correlating ideal point estimates across (1) the 6th and 7th Rehnquist
‘‘natural courts’’ in U.S. Supreme Court; (2) the 3rd and 4th sessions of the 1st Confederate
House; (3) and the 1st and 2nd sessions of the 106th U.S. House of Representatives. For
completeness,wealsoconsidertheestimatesofthecorrelationsobtainedusingW-NOMINATE.
In all cases we fit one-dimensional models; the magnitude of measurement error and hence
its inferential consequences would be amplified if we were to fit higher-dimensional models.
6th-7th Rehnquist Court
small n
W-NOMINATE MCMC
Ignoring Measurment Error .92 .86
Considering Measurement Error .85 .63
95% confidence interval [.54, .98] [-.03, .93]
1st Confederate House, 3rd-4th session
W-NOMINATE MCMC
Ignoring Measurement Error .41 .43
Considering Measurement Error .35 .37
95% confidence interval [.12, .55] [.12, .58]
106th U.S. House, 1st-2nd session
W-NOMINATE MCMC
Ignoring Measurement Error .985 .982
Considering Measurement Error .979 .975
95% confidence interval [.976, .982] [.965, .981]
Table 4. Cross-session Ideal Point Correlations, W-NOMINATE and Bayesian simulation
(MCMC), with and without corrections for measurement error.
Table4presentsthesecross-sessioncorrelationsundertwoscenarios: ignoringmeasure-
ment error and considering measurement error.22 Not only are the correlations lower when
22The correlations generated considering measurement error are generated by repeating the following
21theuncertaintyisaccountedforasaresultofthelargeruncertaintyassociatedwithextremist
legislators, but the 95% confidence intervals also reveal that scholars cannot be as sure of
therelationshipasthepointestimateswouldsuggest. Second,theconsequencesofignoring
measurement error clearly varies as a function of the size of the measurement error, which
in turn depends on the amount of roll call data available. Measurement error is large and
hence consequential in smaller legislatures, such as the Supreme Court. For instance, the
6th and 7th Rehnquist natural courts are characterized by only m = 35 and m = 71 unique
(non-unanimous) voting profiles for the n = 9 justices, and the effects of measurement error
drivethecross-sessioncorrelationfrom.86to.68(witharelativelywideconfidenceinterval).
At the other extreme we have the 106th U.S. House, with roughly 440 legislators and 550 roll
calls per session; with this much roll call data, and strong evidence of uni-dimensionality, we
obtainboth(a)averylargeandpreciseestimateofthecross-sessioncorrelation;(b)relatively
little measurement error. Taking measurement error into account in these circumstances
produces only a minor attenuation of the estimated cross-session correlation combination,
from .982 to .975. The first Confederate Congress is an intermediate case; we correlate the
ideal points of 86 legislators across the 3rd and 4th sessions, with 123 and 109 roll calls
available for analysis, respectively. In this case the effects of measurement error reduce
a mild correlation of .43 to .37, and produce a wide confidence interval on the attenuated
estimate.
Finally, note the comparison with correlations and measurement error corrections pro-
duced using W-NOMINATE ideal point estimates. Earlier we showed that W-NOMINATE’s
reported standard errors are generally too small.23 Since W-NOMINATE tends to underesti-
mate the amount of measurement error accompanying its ideal point estimates, the resulting
measurement error corrections are too small. This is particularly evident if we compare
the confidence intervals on the measurement-error-corrected correlation coefficients. The
W-NOMINATE confidence intervals are generally too narrow, relative to the intervals obtained
via our Bayesian simulation approach. In a small data set, such as the data set on hand for
the Supreme Court analysis, this difference can be extremely consequanital: the confidence
interval obtained via Bayesian simulation is 218% larger than that produced using the
procedure over t = 1,...T: (a) sampling from the posterior density for the ideal points (for the W-NOMINATE
each ideal point is sampled from a normal distribution with mean equal to the W-NOMINATE point estimate and
standard deviation equal to the accompanying W-NOMINATE pseudo standard error), yielding x
(t)
1 and x
(t)
2 ; (b)
computingthecorrelationcoefficient,r(t) = cor(x
(t)
1 ,x
(t)
2 );(c)samplingq(t) fromtheposteriordensityp(q|x
(t)
1 ,x
(t)
2 ),
using an approximation due to Fisher, reported in Lee (1989, 169-173). These sampled values are stored and
summarized for inference in Table 4; e.g., the mean of the sampled values is reported as the point estimate
considering measuring error.
23And, in any event, W-NOMINATE’s pseudo standard errors are pointwise standard errors (i.e., W-NOMINATE
does not report the covariance terms we need to characterize the joint distribution of all ideal point estimates).
22W-NOMINATE estimates and overlaps zero.
8. Incorporating Auxiliary Information: Dimensionality
Asindicatedinsection2,ourBayesianapproachletuseasilyincorporatepriorinformation
as to the nature of the dimensions underlying roll call data. There is no shortage of proposals
as to the types of dimensions that could plausibly underlie the contemporary Congress. For
instance,interestgroupsscorelegislatorsbytrackingvotesonkeyrollcalls,deemedrelevant
to their particular set of policy concerns. Here we estimate a four dimensional model for the
106thU.S.House,withreferencerollcallsdrawnfromthekeyvoteslistsof(a)theAFL-CIO,(b)
Americans for Democratic Action, (c) the Sierra Club; and (d) the Chamber of Commerce. Each
group’s list of key votes serve as our reference roll calls for a specific dimension. Ninety-one
bill serve as reference roll calls, with 14 roll call serving as reference roll calls for more than
one interest group. This overlap in the lists of reference roll calls immediately suggests that
thepreferencesofthesegroupsarenotmutuallyorthogonal,norcanweexpecttherecovered
dimensions to be orthogonal.
To exploit the substantive content of the key roll calls, we specify informative priors on
the relevant discrimination parameters: if bill j is a reference bill for dimension k, we use
the priors bjk ∼ N(±4, .52), with the sign of the prior mean depending on the polarity of the
reference bill24 and bjk0 ∼ N(0,.0252)∀ k0 = / k; for all non-reference bills we use the diffuse
prior bjk ∼ N(0,102)∀ k.
Figure 5 presents point estimates (posterior means) for the ideal points as a matrix of
dimension-against-dimension scatterplots. The most striking feature of these results are
the high correlations across dimensions. It appears that the there is considerable (if not
complete!) redundancy in the interest groups ‘‘dimensions’’: i.e., a legislator’s position on
one dimension is an extremely good predictor of their position on the other dimensions,
so much so that we could collapse these four dimensions onto one dimension, without any
appreciable loss in fit to the data. This constitutes further evidence of unidimensionality in
the 106th U.S. House.
9. Conclusion
ThedevelopmentoftheNOMINATEproceduresrepresentedatremendousstepforwardfor
political science, providing a critical ingredient for the scientific study of legislative politics.
The NOMINATE procedures draw on ideas in psychometric and computing in the early to
24If an ‘‘Aye’’ (‘‘Nay’’) vote is consistent with the group’s position then we assign a positive (negative) prior.
23AFL
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Figure 5. Scatterplot Matrix for Ideal Point Estimates (Posterior Means), Four-Dimensional
Interest-Group Model, 106th U.S. House. Lighter points indicate Democrats (generally to the
left);darkerpointsindicateRepublicans(generallytotheright). Thesolidlinesindicatelinear
regression fits. AFL = AFL-CIO, ADA = Americans for Democratic Action, SC = Sierra Club, CC
= Chamber of Commerce.
24mid 1980s.25 But as Poole and Rosenthal themselves concede, the uncertainty assessments
for NOMINATE ideal point estimates are rough and ready (and generally too small), and the
procedures were not designed for use in small legislative settings. The Bayesian approach
presented here overcomes these shortcomings of NOMINATE.
To be sure, under certain circumstances, it makes little difference whether we use
NOMINATE or our Bayesian approach. For instance, consider the contemporary U.S. House of
Representatives, generating over 500 roll calls per year, with relatively high levels of party
cohesion (and hence apparent unidimensionality). In cases such as these, the results of any
reasonable measurement of preferences in one dimension coincide: for instance, NOMINATE
scores,Heckman-Snyderfactoranalyticapproaches,orourBayesianitem-responseapproach
are almost perfectly correlated. But this is a reasonable special case. We see considerable
divergence between our Bayesian approach and NOMINATE for higher dimensional fits, or
when analyzing smaller data sets (for which NOMINATE is not well-suited). Indeed, in
the limiting case of a ‘‘micro-legislature’’ like the Supreme Court, the standard version of
W-NOMINATE fails altogether, and even the ‘‘small-n’’ version of W-NOMINATE understates
the measurement error inherent in the estimates. Moreover, the substantive consequences
of NOMINATE shortcomings in the small n case are not innocuous; for example, relying on
NOMINATE scores leads to a considerable overestimate of ideological stability on the Court.
In sum, the Bayesian approach presented here represents an improvement over extant
methods. Bayesian simulation exploits tremendous increases in computing power available
to social scientists over the last decade or so: estimation and inference via simulation ---
long known to be a desirable statistical methodology --- (e.g., Metropolis and Ulam 1949) ---
is now a reality. Our statistical model is a direct operationalization of the Euclidean spatial
votingmodelswithconventionalquadraticutilitiesandnormalerrors. Ourmodelworksinany
legislative setting, irrespective of the size of the legislature or its agenda. Bayesian methods
alsoallowauxiliaryinformationtobebroughttobearontheanalysisinaprincipledyetformal
way; this auxiliary information may include (but is not restricted to) expert judgments about
dimensional structure, the location of extremist legislators, legislator-specific covariates, or
the evolution of the legislative agenda. In this way Bayesian methods lets roll call analysis
become less a mechanical scaling exercise, but a way to empirically test models about
legislative behavior.
25See Poole (1999) for a history of the development of the NOMINATE procedures; we are also grateful to
Keith Poole for personal communication on these issues. According to Poole, the devlopment of NOMINATE was
essentially complete by 1985, when access to a supercomputer allowed multi-dimensional fitting.
25A. Appendix
A.1. Gibbs Sampler for Roll Call Analysis
As shown in the text, the d-dimensional spatial voting model yields the latent linear
regression y*
ij = bjxi -αj +eij, where y*
ij is the latent utility differential for legislator i on roll call
j,xi isthei-thlegislator’sidealpointeij
iid ∼ N(0,1),withthecensoringruleyij = 1 ⇐⇒ y*
ij > 0
and yij = 0 ⇐⇒ y*
ij ≤ 0 linking the latent linear regression to the observed roll calls. In
our Bayesian approach, priors are required for the parameters of substantive interest, bj
and αj, j = 1,...,m and xi,i = 1,...,n. Given the normal errors for eij, normal priors for the
parameters of substantive interest let us exploit conjugacy, leading to simple expressions
and computations for the posterior density. For bj and αj, we denote the priors as N(s0,S0);
we generally choose vague priors by setting s0 = 0 and S0 = j · Id+1, with j a large positive
quantity (e.g., j = 52); see the text for the use of informative priors on particular ‘‘reference
roll calls’’. For the latent traits, we use the prior xi
iid ∼ N(0,Id).
The goal is to compute the joint posterior density for all model parameters bj and αj,
j = 1,...,m and xi,i = 1,...,n. The Gibbs sampler provides a computer-intensive exploration
or‘‘randomtour’’ofthisjointdensity,bysuccessivelysamplingfromtheconditionaldensities
that together characterize the joint density. Letting t index iterations of the Gibbs sampler,
these conditional densities are
1. g(y*
ij|yij,x*
i,bjαj). At the start of iteration t, we have b
(t-1)
j , α
(t-1)
j and x
(t-1)
i . We sample y
*(t)
ij
from one of the two following densities, depending on whether we observed a ‘‘Yea’’
(yij = 1) or a ‘‘Nay’’ (yij = 0):
y
*
ij|(yij = 0,x
(t-1)
i ,b
(t-1)
j ,α
(t-1)
j ) ∼ N(l
(t-1)
ij ,1)I(y
*
ij < 0) (trunc. Normal)
y
*
ij|(yij = 1,x
(t-1)
i ,b
(t-1)
j ,α
(t-1)
j ) ∼ N(l
(t-1)
ij ,1)I(y
*
ij ≥ 0) (trunc. Normal)
where l
(t-1)
ij = x
(t-1)
i b
(t-1)
j - α
(t-1)
j and I(·) is an indicator function. For abstentions and
other missing roll calls we sample y
*(t)
ij from the untruncated Normal density N(l
(t-1)
ij ,1),
effectivelygeneratingmultipleimputationsforthesemissingdataoveriterationsofthe
Gibbs sampler.
2. g(bj,αj|X,y*
ij). For j = 1,...,m, sample b
(t)
j and α
(t)
j from the multivariate Normal
densitywithmeanvector

X*0X* + S-1
0
-1 h
X*0y
*(t)
·j + S-1
0 s0
i
andvariance-covariancematrix

X*0X* + S-1
0
-1
, where X* is a n-by-(d + 1) matrix with typical row x*
i = (x
(t-1)
i ,-1), y
*(t)
·j is
a n-by-1 vector of sampled latent utility differentials for the j-th roll call, and recalling
that N(s0,S0) is the prior for bj and αj. This amount to running ‘‘Bayesian regressions’’
26of y
*(t)
·j on x
(t-1)
i and a negative intercept, and then sampling from the posterior density
for the coefficients bj and αj, for j = 1,...,m.
3. g(xi|y*
ij,bj,αj). Re-arranging the latent linear regression yields wij = y*
ij + αj = x0
ibj + eij.
Collapse these equations over the j subscript, to yield the n regressions wi = Bxi + ei,
whereBisthembydmatrixwiththej-throwgivenbyb0
j. Thatis,wehavenregressions,
with the ideal points xi as parameters to be updated. Again exploiting conjugacy, the
update is performed by sampling each x
(t)
i from the d-dimensional Normal density with
mean vector (B0B + Id)-1B0wi and variance-covariance matrix (B0B + Id)-1, where the
identity matrix in the variance term comes from the N(0,Id) prior for the xi.
Samplingfromthesedistributionsupdatesalltheunknownquantitiesinthemodel. Atthe
endofiterationt,denotethecurrentvaluesoftheparametersofinterestasn(t) = (B(t),α(t),X(t)).
Iterating the Gibbs sampler produces a sequence n(1),n(2),... that comprises a Markov chain,
withthejointposteriordensityfornasitslimitingdistribution. Thatis,afteralargenumberof
iterations ofthe Gibbs sampler, successive Gibbssamples are drawsfrom the jointposterior.
These samples are saved and summarized for inference and communication to readers. Any
function of these parameters can also be computed and saved, such as rank orderings of the
legislators, pairwise comparisons of legislators, or the separating hyperplanes for particular
roll calls.
The Gibbs sampler is initialized as follows. For the ideal points, we first double-center the
n-by-m roll call matrix (subtracting out column and row means), compute a n-by-n correlation
matrix from the double-centered roll call matrix, and extract its first d eigenvectors; this
n-by-d matrix provides our initial values for x, denoted x(0). Note that these initial values are
the estimates we would get from treating the ideal-point estimation problem as a principal-
componentsfactoranalysisproblem,ignoringthefactthattherollcalldataarenotcontinuous
variables (the binary character of the roll call data becomes less problematic as m → ∞,
and so for large roll call data sets from contemporary U.S. Congresses this procedure yields
excellent start values). We are grateful to Keith Poole for suggesting this procedure, which is
also used in NOMINATE.26 For the bill-specific parameters bj and αj we obtain start values by
running probits of the observed votes y·j on the x(0), j = 1,...,m.
With any Markov-chain Monte Carlo approach, diagnosing convergence of the chain is
critical. Our experience is that with small roll call data sets, the Gibbs sampler performs
extremely well, converging quickly to the neighborhood of a posterior mode. Moreover,
because the data sets are small, iterations are fast and so it is possible to generate an
26In unpublished work, Poole has shown that if voting is perfect in one dimension, then the ranks of the first
eigenvector of the correlation matrix of the double-centered roll call matrix recovers the rank ordering of the
legislators’ ideal points.
27extremely precise characterization of the joint posterior relatively quickly (i.e., we can obtain
alotofposteriorsamplesinashortamountofcomputertime). Inlargerrollcallsettings--with
patterns of missing data, extremist legislative behavior and lop-sided roll calls -- the ideal
point estimates can display slow-mixing (high within-chain autocorrelations over iterations
of the Gibbs sampler). Convergence diagnostics (e.g., Cowles and Carlin 1996) indicate that
up to 5,000,000 Gibbs samples can be required for roll call data sets from a recent House
of Representatives; discarding legislators with high rates of missing data and/or extremely
lop-sided roll calls speeds up convergence considerably. In analyzing these larger roll call
data sets we also use a computationally cheaper EM algorithm to help move away from the
initial values closer to the joint posterior mode; the EM algorithm differs from the Gibbs
sampler in that we update parameters to their expected values (given by the means of the
conditionaldistributionsgivenabove),ratherthansamplingfromtheconditionaldistribution.
After a pre-specified number of iterations (or when successive iterations of the EM algorithm
produce no further change in the parameter values) we switch to Gibbs sampling. We thin
the output of extremely long runs of the Gibbs sampler to produce, say, 1,000 approximately
independent samples from the posterior for these parameters.
A.2. Computing
For small roll call data sets, the free general-purpose Gibbs sampling package Win-
BUGS (Spiegelhalter et al. 1997) can be used to implement our approach: only a
few lines of BUGS commands are needed (an example appears on Jackman’s website,
http://jackman.stanford.edu/mcmc). Given the larger number of Gibbs samples required
when analyzing larger roll call data sets, we use a C program authored by Jackman. We use
S-Plus for preparing roll call data sets for analysis, inspecting the Gibbs sampler output, and
for producing the graphs and tables in the body of the paper. All code is available upon
request.
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